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Abstract
Existing empirical work looking at the eects of parental income on IQ, schooling,
wealth, race, and personality is only able to explain about half of the observed intergenerational income elasticity. This paper provides a possible behavioral explanation
for this elasticity in which heterogeneous agents in sequential generations choose their
education levels in the face of loss averse preferences and weak borrowing constraints.
These borrowing-constrained agents make education investment choices in part to avoid
consumption losses rather than to maximize lifetime resources. The model generates
a positive intergenerational income elasticity even when there are functioning capital
markets to nance education investments. I nd empirical support for the J-shape education decision rule generated by the model and show that it is mostly successful in
matching the asymmetric intergenerational transition rates between income quintiles of
white families.
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1

Introduction
A free market system can create a large amount of income inequality.

The top 1% of

earners in the United States earned 12.4% of the total wage income in the United States in
2007 (Piketty and Saez 2009). Acceptance of this system, especially in the United States, is
generally predicated on the idea that each person has a good chance of success, no matter
his starting point.

However, recent research (e.g.

Mazumder 2005, Mulligan 1997) shows

that the elasticity of income between parents and children is as high as 0.6. As Mazumder
(2005) notes, at this level it will take six generations for the descendants of someone at 25% or
200% of the mean to be within ve percent of the average.

1

Furthermore, Hertz (2005) shows

that there is a signicant auence net, in which children of parents with income in the top
decile have a high chance of remaining in at least the top quintile, while those with parents
in the bottom decile are very likely to be poor themselves, caught in the well-documented
poverty trap. Both Hertz (2005) and Mazumder (2008) show that white and black families
experience quite dierent, and asymmetric, transition rates which would not be implied by
a linear model with an elasticity of 0.6 (or any other value).
In the empirical literature, there is some evidence (Blanden and Gregg, 2004, Corak et
al 2004) that children from families with higher income do receive more and higher-quality
education. Shea (2000), on the other hand, nds only a minimal relationship between family
income and child education. In this paper, I present my own ndings that there is a non-linear
relationship between family income and education which may help explain these dierences.
Theoretically, there are a number of reasons why parents' and children's income (and
education) may be correlated across generations. Those parents with more education will

1 Becker

and Tomes (1986) review a number of studies that nd an intergenerational elasticity of less than
0.2. At this level it would take only two generations for the descendants of someone at 200% of the mean to
be within 5% of the average. Unfortunately, these studies suered from a lack of data so that estimates of
lifetime income were much noisier than in recent studies. Mazumder (2005) is able to use up to 16 years of
father's income, averaging out the noise of transitory income, and nds an intergenerational elasticity of 0.6.
Other studies (such as Mulligan 1997) use instrumental variable methods and get similar estimates while the
Pew Economic Mobility study group settled on a number between 0.45-0.5 (Isaacs et al, 2008).
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also tend to have more income, out of which they can pay for more (and higher quality)
education for their children.

Parents with fewer nancial resources (who will also tend

to have lower education) will be less able to nance the education of their children.

The

literature has explored the idea, beginning with Galor and Zeira (1993) and continued in a
number of other papers such as Owen and Weil (1998), that capital markets for education
are not perfect and that lower-income families may face more severe borrowing constraints
than higher income families, getting caught in a poverty trap and unable to invest in the
optimal amount of education.
The problem with this explanation is that it assumes imperfect, or non-existent, capital
markets in nancing education. Given the high correlation between education and income,
markets should (and do) exist to nance education expenses despite the lack of collateral.
According to data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES 2008), many
(if not most) students are able to cover much of their higher education expenses at public
universities through a combination of grants and loans, casting doubt on the idea that market
failure in capital markets is to blame.
This paper proposes a novel transmission mechanism between parents and children that
focuses on the dierences in expectations, or reference consumption, among children from
dierent income levels. If children form a reference level of consumption during childhood
(based on family consumption) and have loss-averse utility functions, so that utility is concave
in gains but convex in losses, then children from higher-income families will choose more

2

education than an otherwise identical person from a poorer family .

Those at the very

bottom of the income distribution will invest more in education than those immediately above
them as they nd it easier to replace reference consumption (and avoid losses), generating
a J-shaped education investment decision and asymmetric intergenerational transition rates

2 The

model assumes that increased time spent investing in education reduces consumption in the rst
period. While there is very little data available to test this assumption, there is some qualitative evidence
in the sociological literature (see, eg, Connor 2001 for the UK, Roderick et al 2008 for Chicago, Brown et
al 2009 for Appalachia, Hahn and Price 2008 for a white vs. black comparison, and McGrath et al 2001 for
Iowa farm families) that shows many who are eligible forgo higher education in order to work and increase
consumption levels.
4

between income quintiles.
Previous research has assumed that reference consumption depends either on a person's
level of consumption as a child (e.g.

de la Croix, 2000) (supported by Waldkirch et al,

2004) or as coming from those around them or above them in the income distribution as in
Genicot and Ray (2009)

3.

I develop a model with sequential generations in which heteroge-

neous agents are loss averse, inherit their reference level of consumption from their parents,
and then must choose their education investment. The baseline model with loss aversion and
weak borrowing constraints is able to generate an intergenerational elasticity of wages of 0.14
even when earning ability is completely independent between generations, suggesting that
loss aversion is one possible explanation for the unexplained income elasticity between generations identied in Bowles et al (2005). The model generates asymmetric intergenerational
transition rates between income quintiles and a J-shaped decision rule in education with
family consumption as the explanatory variable. I test this implication using the NLSY97
data set and nd some support for the J-shaped decision rule in education using both OLS
and semi-parametric regressions.
The next section describes the model with particular attention to the assumption of
loss-averse preferences while section three reviews relevant data moments from the intergenerational persistence literature. The numerical solution to the model and simulated results
from the calibrated model are presented in section four. Section ve presents the empirical
results which support the J-shaped education decision rule implied by the theoretical model.
Section six concludes.

3 The

key assumption that drives results dierent than those presented here appears to be that aspirations
(against which utility is measured) are formed only by looking at those above you in the income distribution
despite their use of an S-shaped utility function as in this paper.
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2

Model

2.1

Basic Setup

The model presented here is a partial-equilibrium model with sequential generations. Agents
live for three periods. The rst period, labeled 0, can be thought of as childhood, in which
agents do not have to make any decisions. Children learn their earning ability level,
reference consumption level,

c0 ,

and the bequest,

T,

ψ,

their

that they will receive at the beginning

of period one. Both the reference level of consumption and the bequest come directly from
their parents. Earning ability diers across agents and is normally distributed:

ψi = ρψi−1 + (1 − ρ)ψ̄ + χi
χi ∼ N (0, (1 − ρ2 )σψ2 )

I assume, in the baseline model, that earning ability is independent across generations. That
is, a child's earning ability is completely independent of the earning ability of the parent so
that

ρ = 0.

with mean

ψ̄

Thus each agent draws a random earning ability from a normal distribution
and standard deviation

σψ .

The second period of life, labeled 1, is the education period. Agents, knowing their earning ability, reference consumption, and bequest, invest in education to maximize lifetime
utility. Because there is no uncertainty in this model, agents are also able to choose consumption in periods 1 and 2, saving (or borrowing) between periods, and the bequest level
they will leave to the next generation. The value function is described by equation 1.

6

V (c0 , T, ψ) = max 0 U (z1 ) + β[U (z2 ) + B(T 0 )]

(1a)

e,c1 ,c2 ,T

s.t.
s≥Ω

(1b)

ε(e) ≤ T + Ω

(1c)

c1 + s + ε(e) = (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) + T

(1d)

c2 + T 0 = ω(e, ψ) + s(1 + r)

(1e)

c1 , c2 , T 0 ≥ 0

Where

zt

(1f )

is the percent change from the reference level of consumption:

Note that this gives a natural minimum to
discussed below. The level of education is
utility derived from giving a bequest,

ω(·, ·)

zt

e,

zt =

ct −c0
.
c0

of -1, which is important for loss aversion, as

and the function

B(·)

T 0 , to the next generation.

measures the warm glow

The wage is determined by

which I assume to have the form:

ln[ω(e, ψ)] = α1 e + α2 e2 + ζeψ + κψ
Where I assume that

α1 , α2 , ζ, κ ≥ 0.

that is quadratic in education.

This is a fairly standard semi-log wage function

The major dierence between equation (2) and a more

standard wage function from the labor literature is that earning ability,
The parameter

ζ

(2)

ψ,

is observable.

represents the idea captured in quantile wage regressions (e.g.

Lemieux

2006) that the return to education is higher for those with higher earning ability. The cost
function for education is given by:

ε(e) = φ1 e + φ2 e2
With

φ1 , φ2 ≥ 0

(3)

so that education costs are at least weakly convex. The wage function
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and the education function assure that there is some level of education,

e∗ ,

which may be at

a corner, that uniquely maximizes lifetime resources for each level of earning ability,

ψ.

The rst two constraints in equation (1) reect potential borrowing constraints, where
borrowing is less than some level

Ω

(discussed below) and where the agent may only use

her bequest and her borrowing in order to nance the education expense,

ε(e).

The two

constraints (1d) and (1e) represent the per period budget constraints, where agents are not
allowed to die in debt and the nal constraint ensures that consumption and bequests are
non-negative. Savings are assumed to grow at a risk-free rate
cost of education,

ε(e),

r.

Agents face both a direct

and an opportunity cost of education so that they work only

(1 − e)

in the rst period. The opportunity cost is higher for those with higher earning ability as
wages are increasing in

ψ.

The wage per unit of time worked is the same in both periods

and depends on the chosen level of education,

e,

and innate earning ability,

ψ.

Because

the wage is increasing in the chosen level of education, this opportunity cost is also convex.
However, because loss-averse utility is not everywhere concave, the rst order conditions do
not provide a solution to the maximization problem as the second order test fails. Therefore I
use numerical methods to solve the maximization problem as described in this section below.
At the beginning of period 2, agents reproduce so that the next generation's period 0
will match up with period 2 of the previous generation. The consumption level chosen by
the parent generation in period 2 becomes the reference level of consumption for the child
generation.

Further, the bequest level chosen by the parent is given to the child at the

beginning of period 1. The intergenerational persistence in the model comes from the fact
that children inherit the reference consumption directly from their parents.
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2.2

Loss Aversion

The utility function,

U (zt ),

will be allowed to take two main forms. In the version of the

model with reference consumption (but no loss aversion), the per period utility will be given
by equation (5).

1 − e−µzt
µ

U (zt ) =

(5)

Equation (5) is a standard constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function which
is increasing and concave for all levels of

zt .

In this case, agents will try to smooth consump-

tion across the two periods as utility is concave everywhere so that there is no substantial
dierence between consuming just above the reference level or just below.
The more interesting case (at least in this model) is when the utility function represents

4

loss averse preferences .

The key insight represented by loss aversion is that agents have

concave utility when it comes to gains (as in traditional expected utility theory) but have
convex utility when it comes to losses, even in riskless choice.

In addition, the marginal

utility of a loss is around twice as large as the marginal utility of a comparably sized gain.
In this model there is no risk per se (as there is no uncertainty for the agent), so a loss averse
utility function means that agents will avoid losses as much as possible. We can represent
loss averse preferences by equation (6) as suggested by Kobberling and Wakker (2004).

U (zt ) =




 1−e−µzt

for



λ eνzt −1

for

µ

ν

4

zt ≥ 0
(6)

zt < 0

While loss aversion was rst introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as part of their prospect

theory about making decisions under uncertainty, in this model there is no uncertainty and I use loss aversion
as in Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
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The loss aversion parameter

λ

was estimated by Kahneman and Tversky to be around

2.25 with other estimates usually between 1.5 and 3 (Camerer 2005). A value larger than one
means that marginal utility is larger for losses than for comparably sized gains. Note also
that utility is concave in gains but convex in losses. That is, marginal utility is decreasing
away from zero in both directions, so that just as the marginal utility of a gain decreases as
the gain increases, so too does the marginal disutility decrease as the loss increases.
Neilson (2002) has suggested a nomenclature for loss aversion which divides potential
loss averse utility functions into those exhibiting weak and strong loss aversion. With strong
loss aversion, marginal utility is everywhere higher for a loss than for a gain.
loss averse function
In this case, since
can write

U (·)
zt

is strongly loss averse if

U (0) = 0

and

That is, a

U 0 (y) ≤ U 0 (z) ∀z < 0 < y .

is measured in percentage terms (and so has a minimum at -1) we

U 0 (−1) ≥ U 0 (0)+

where

U 0 (0)+

is the marginal utility as

zt

approaches 0 from

the right. A strongly loss averse utility function is represented in Figure 1(a) and marginal
utility in gure 1(b).

[Figure 1 about here.]

In order to get tractable results, I assume strong loss aversion as in Bowman et al (1999),
requiring that

ν < ln(λ)

in equation (6). For a given investment in education, agents will

either face a gain in both periods, a loss in both periods, or a loss in one period and a gain
in the other period. Because utility is concave in gains, agents will smooth gains across the
two periods (as much as possible, given the borrowing constraint).

If an agent faces two

losses, utility will be maximized by putting as much of the loss into one period as possible
and minimizing the loss in the next period. The larger loss will, by necessity, be in period
1, the education period, due to the borrowing constraint. Finally, if the agent faces a loss
in period 1 and a gain in period 2, she will choose to minimize the loss as much as possible
by reducing the gain in period 2. Eliminating the loss in period 1 may not be possible if the
agent faces a borrowing constraint. More details of the solution are given in section 2.5.
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2.3

Borrowing Constraint

Borrowing constraints, represented by

Ω

in equation (1), interact with loss aversion in

important ways. Easier credit, or less severe borrowing constraints, will allow agents to avoid
losses. Tighter borrowing constraints, on the other hand, make a loss in period one much
more likely even if the agent will have a large gain in period two.
I explore three dierent degrees of borrowing constraint in this paper. First, there may
be perfect capital markets. In this case there is no period one borrowing constraint but only
a lifetime solvency constraint and we can write:

Ωlt = −[

ω(e, ψ)
]
(1 + r)

(weakest, lifetime budget constraint only)

(7a)

Second, I assume more realistically that agents can borrow up to their direct cost of
education (assuming this is less than the lifetime borrowing constraint). Students can borrow
the direct cost of education, but capital markets are imperfect as they cannot borrow to
bring consumption from the second period forward to the rst. In this case the borrowing
constraint becomes:

Ωed = −ε(e)

(weak, education cost borrowing constraint)

(7b)

Winter (2009) shows that as many as 18% of households may face borrowing constraints

5

when nancing education and some education loans require parents to co-sign the loan .
The nal borrowing constraint I explore in this paper is a function of parental income:

Ωp = f [ω(e−1 , ψ−1 )]

(strong, borrowing constraint based on parent income)

(7c)

5 According to the Department of Education (http://federalstudentaid.ed.gov/federalaidrst/), while
Staord loans only require a student signature, so-called parent PLUS loans require a credit check and
co-signer as do most private (i.e. not federally subsidized) loans.
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Where

ω(e−1 , ψ−1 )

is the income of the previous generation. In this case, agents from

poorer families will face a more severe borrowing constraint than agents from richer families.
This could play a signicant role in keeping those who are born poor from rising substantially
in the income distribution.

2.4

Bequest Motive

The function

T 0.

B(T 0 ) in equation (1) gives the utility gained from leaving a bequest of size

This type of bequest, used in Galor and Zeria (1993), is known as a warm glow bequest

because the person giving the bequest does not take the

utility

of the person receiving the

bequest directly into consideration. This is required to avoid perverse incentives for parents
in setting the level of a child's reference consumption. I use the same CARA function for

B(·)

as is used for gains in utility:

B(T 0 ) =
Because

zt

1 − e−θ(T
θ

0 /c )
0

(8)

is measured in percentage terms, it is useful to scale bequests by the level of

reference consumption. If

θ=µ

then the agent sets

T0
c0

= z2

when

z2 ≥ 0

or

T 0 = c2 − c0 .

In many cases, however, agents will optimally have zero gain in the second period, in order
to minimize losses in period one. An agent consuming at (or below) the reference level of
consumption in period 2 will leave no bequest to the next generation.

2.5

Solution Methodology

Because the model makes the assumption of strong loss aversion, and given that agents
choose consumption for only two periods, we can still solve for how they will divide a certain
level of lifetime resources between periods (as in Bowman et al (1999)) despite the lack of
concavity in the loss-averse utility function.
For a given level of education we can calculate both total lifetime resources and the
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maximum consumption in the rst period and minimum consumption in the second period,
which will vary depending on the given borrowing constraint. For simplicity, I assume that

β = 1 + r = 1.

For any given level of education, I let

Rlt (e, ψ)

denote lifetime resources,

2
1
(e, ψ, T 0 ) denote minimum period
(e, ψ) denote maximum period one resources and Rmin
Rmax
two consumption when period one consumption is maximized.
consumption when the borrowing constraint binds while

1
Rmax
(e, ψ) gives the maximum

2
Rmin
(e, ψ, T 0 ) gives the lowest level

of period two consumption when all available resources are consumed in period 1. We can
write:

Rlt (e, ψ) = (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) + T + −ε(e) + ω(e, ψ) − T 0
1
Rmax
(e, ψ) = (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) + T − ε(e) − Ω
2
Rmin
(e, ψ, T 0 ) = ω(e, ψ) + Ω(1 + r) − T 0

(9a)
(9b)
(9c)

The consumption and saving decisions for an agent for all possible levels of these three
values are given in Table 1. If the agent can, he will spread gains across both periods. If
he has a binding borrowing constraint, this will reduce period one consumption. However,
if faced with a loss, he will maximize the loss in period 1 in order to minimize the loss in
period 2. This is the result of strong loss aversion.

[Table 1 about here.]

We can write the indirect lifetime utility function associated with each level of education,
based on the consumption and bequest pattern solved for above:

W (e, c0 , T, ψ) = max 0 U (z1 ) + β[U (z2 ) + B(T 0 )]
c1 ,c2 ,T

The optimal level of education,

ê,

maximizes this indirect utility function:

ê = argmax W (e, c0 , T, ψ)
e
13

(10)

Subject to the constraints in equation (1).
In my numerical solution in section four, I assume the agent has a discrete number of
education choices available, designed to mimic a high school dropout, a high school graduate,
some college/Associate's degree, Bachelor's degree, Master's degree, and a PhD/professional
degree. Given the discrete choice set it is easy to nd the utility-maximizing education level
by simply comparing total lifetime utility for each education level.
In addition, we can calculate

e∗ , the level of education that maximizes lifetime resources,

in the absence of borrowing constraints:

e∗ = argmax (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) − ε(e) + ω(e, ψ)

(11)

e
The education level

e∗

equates the marginal cost (both direct and opportunity) of educa-

tion with the marginal benet in terms of wages. No agent will ever choose an education level
higher than

e∗

as adding an extra unit of education above

e∗

will reduce lifetime resources

and either increase a loss or reduce a gain in one or both periods, and therefore must reduce
utility.
However, it is possible that the utility-maximizing level of education is less than the
resource-maximizing level (ê

≤ e∗ ) because of the presence of borrowing constraints and loss

aversion. Reducing the level of education from

e∗

will increase resources available in period

one by reducing the direct and opportunity cost of education.

These extra resources can

then be used to reduce or eliminate a loss in the rst period even if it means reducing a gain
in the second period.
I use the consumption/savings levels shown in Table 1 to solve the model, making sure

6

that it converges to a stable distribution . I can then calibrate and simulate the model and
compare the non-calibrated moments in the data to the simulation results. These simulation
results are reported in section four, but rst I review the data that the model is attempting

6 For

wages, for example, I add up the wages in each decile and then take the norm of the dierence
between generations. For convergence, I require this to be less than some number .

14

to match.

3

Target Intergenerational Moments

Measuring the elasticity of income between generations is conceptually straightforward but
empirically dicult. Most longitudinal data sets do not span a long enough time frame to
include income from more than one generation. And those that do have a long enough time
span, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), usually don't have many years
of income for both generations. Studies that used only a limited number of years for either
or both generations are prone to measurement error because they are likely to be measuring
transitory income rather than permanent income (see Bowles et al (2005) for a discussion of
the literature).
Using Social Security Administration data in the U.S., matched with the 1984 Survey of
Income and Program Participation, Mazumder (2005) nds that the estimated intergenerational income elasticity increases as the number of years of income for the father increases.
The elasticity is less than 0.3 using only two years of father's income but climbs as high as
0.6 when using 16 years of father's income. Mulligan (1997) uses the PSID to measure the
intergenerational elasticity of a number of relevant factors using an instrumental variable approach to overcome measurement error. A regression of child wages on parent's wages yields
an estimated coecient of between 0.32 (OLS) and 0.53 (IV). Family income has a coecient
between generations of between 0.47 (OLS) and 0.71 (IV), while family consumption has a

7

coecient of between 0.54 (OLS) and 0.77 (IV) .
Hertz (2005) constructs non-linear transition matrices from parental income deciles to
child's deciles using the PSID. Adjusting income for age, he nds that a child with a parent in
the bottom income decile has a 31.5% chance of staying in that bottom decile and over a 50

7 In

Mulligan's instrumental variable regressions he uses family income as an instrument for family consumption which is measured with a lot of noise, as well as using instruments such as occupation and school
categories as instruments for lifetime parental income.

15

percent chance of being in the bottom quintile. On the other extreme, a child with a parent in
the top income decile has a 29.6% chance of staying in that top decile and a 43.3% chance of
remaining in the top quintile. In this paper, I will focus on four key intergenerational income
transition rates. The poverty trap measures how likely it is for children born in the bottom
quintile of the income distribution to stay there as adults while the auence net measures
how likely children born in the top quintile will stay on top. The jump up rate measures
how often children born in the bottom quintile are able to jump up to the top quintile of the
income distribution, while the fall down rate measures how many children from the auent
top quintile fall down to the bottom quintile. Because of signicant racial dierences in the
transition rates, in my numerical calibrations I focus on matching the distribution of white
families.

4

Numerical Solution and Calibration Results

4.1

Parameter Values and Calibration Targets

This section presents a numerical solution and results from simulations of the model, comparing the model with loss aversion to that with reference consumption levels but with utility
that is concave everywhere. Table 2 presents parameter values and their sources that are

8

common to both versions of the model .

[Table 2 about here.]

I calibrate wage parameters,

α1 , α2 , ζ,

and

κ

from equation (2) to match median income

by education and the education distribution for white full-time workers. I divide education

8 In

his review of the loss aversion literature, Camerer (2005) nds empirical support for a loss aversion
parameter between 1.5 and 3.0. In this model, a lower loss aversion parameter does reduce the elasticity
numbers reported below, mainly due to the assumption of strong loss aversion which requires ν < ln(λ) in
equation (6).
16

9

into six possible levels ranging evenly from 0 to 1. . Because behavior is signicantly dierent
for loss averse agents as opposed to those with concave preferences, I calibrate the model
separately for these two utility functions.

For the baseline calibration, I allow agents to

borrow the entire direct cost of their education so that

Ω = −ε(e).

The observed targets

and calibrated moments are presented in Table 3.

[Table 3 about here.]

Despite the fact that the model is under identied, both models do a fairly good job of
matching the targeted moments. They suer at the extremes as neither is able to generate
a large enough percentage of the population investing in the top level of education despite
wages that are higher than in the data. This is likely due to the simplifying assumption that
investing in a professional/PhD in the education period consumes all of the agent's time so
that they are unable to earn anything in the rst period

10 .

I report the calibrated parameters from equation (2) in Table 4. In order to determine
whether or not these are reasonable values, I also present the minimum, average, and maximum return to the equivalent of one year of education and the ratio of the maximum wage
to the minimum. The return to education averages 8.4% in the loss-averse model and 7.3%
in the concave utility model. The labor literature generally nds a value between 5 and 10
percent, so these values seem reasonable.

[Table 4 about here.]

4.2

Education Decision Rules Solution

Based on (11), the resource maximizing level of education,
maximizing level,

ê),

e∗

(as opposed to the utility

will depend only on an agent's earning ability. An individual's wage

9 Cooley

(1997) and Cooley & Prescott (1995) give a good overview of the process and goal of calibrations.
To nd my calibrated values, I use a simple Euclidean norm of the dierence between target and calibrated
moments of the 12 target moments and search over a grid that varies by values of 0.005.
10 While I'm sure most of my readers would prefer the wage distribution in Table 3, in the model only
those who are already facing a rst-period loss will invest in the highest level of education despite the high
(calibrated wages).
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is completely determined by his level of education and earning ability, while the cost of
education (both direct and opportunity) depends only on the level of education chosen.
This resource-maximizing level of education,

e∗

is a monotonically increasing function of

earning ability as those with more earning ability invest more in education. Because of the
dierences in the calibrated parameter values for the wage function shown in Table 4, the
level of

e∗

will be slightly dierent for the two models.

The education level chosen to maximize lifetime utility,

e∗ .

Figure 2 graphs the decision rule for

ê,

ê,

may be less than or equal to

(as a function of reference consumption) for

a loss-averse agent with an ability level approximately one standard deviation above the
mean, for dierent levels of bequest. For this individual, the level of education that would
maximize lifetime resources is

e∗ = 1,

the maximum level of education. However, those with

an intermediate reference consumption level will optimally choose a lower, and sometimes
substantially lower, level of education. Intuitively, agents with a moderate reference level of
consumption can more easily replace it with a lower level of education, thus avoiding a loss
in period 1. Choosing a level of education less than

e∗

allows them to minimize or eliminate

the loss in period one. Overall lifetime utility will be increased, even if choosing

ê < 1 means

a lower (or non-existent) gain in period two.
As reference consumption increases, the likelihood of a loss in the rst period increases
(until it is equal to 1). At very high levels of reference consumption, agents cannot avoid
losses in period 1 and can only hope to eliminate or reduce losses in period 2. In order to
decrease or eliminate the loss in period two, they will maximize second period income by
investing in the resource-maximizing level of education,

e∗ , so that those from higher-income

families will themselves have higher income.
Note that those with the lowest reference consumption will invest in higher levels of
education than those directly to their right in the reference consumption distribution. This
is because with very low levels of reference consumption it is easier to avoid a loss in the
rst period, even when getting more education. The dashed line at
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c0 = 2 is the equilibrium

minimum reference consumption for agents in the model simulation. To the left of this line
agents would invest in more education, but agents never visit this region of the state space
in equilibrium.

[Figure 2 about here.]

The education investment decision under concave preferences is quite dierent.
agents can borrow to nance the direct cost of education,
the decision rule is simply a horizontal line at
constraint, education will be upward sloping in

e∗ .

c0

ε(e),

When

as in the benchmark model,

If there is a more severe borrowing

until the constraint no longer binds and

the agent can invest in the optimal level of education. The J-shaped education investment
decision for loss averse agents and the contrasting at or upward sloping investment-decision
rule for concave utility agents is the main econometrically testable implication of the model:

H1: The education investment decision for children will depend on childhood
family income and will initially decrease and then increase as family consumption
increases.
Note that this implies that students can borrow the direct cost of education. If those at the
bottom face a borrowing constraint, then even with loss aversion we would only expect an
upward sloping education decision rule (the J would not turn up at the bottom).

4.3

Matching Elasticities Across Generations

As discussed above, loss aversion contributes to a positive intergenerational elasticity of
income for two reasons. First, those with moderately low parental income (and thus reference
consumption) have an incentive to invest in less education in order to avoid losses in the
rst period of life even though this will reduce gains in the second period due to their lower
wage. Second, those with higher reference consumption are likely to be faced with a loss in
period one no matter what level of education they choose. In order to avoid or minimize a
loss in period two, they will invest in more education in period one and raise their wage and
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consumption in period two. Thus, the same factors that contribute to a positive elasticity of
earnings across generations are also likely to contribute to a positive elasticity of education.
Table 5 lists intergenerational elasticities for wages, education, consumption, and bequests, allowing us to compare the simulated results to the data. The data for the intergenerational elasticity of income comes from Mazumder (2005) while the elasticities of education
and consumption comes from Mulligan (1997). I present results for both types of utility functions as well as three dierent borrowing constraints and with

11 .

is independent across generations

ρ=0

so that earning ability

When there is only a lifetime borrowing constraint as

in equation (7a) (columns (1) and (4)), all agents choose the resource-maximizing education
level for both models, and because earning ability is independent across generations, there is
a zero elasticity of both income and education. With a borrowing constraint in which agents
are able to borrow the full direct cost of education, as in equation (7b) (columns (2) and (5)),
the loss averse model is able to generate an elasticity of income of 0.14 and an elasticity of
education of 0.24, while the concave utility model still exhibits roughly zero elasticity of both
income and education. Finally, I present results when the borrowing constraint is a function
of reference consumption,

Ω = f (c0 )

as in (7c).

For simplicity, I assume that those with

reference consumption in the bottom twenty percent do not have access to nancial markets
and so cannot borrow at all while everybody else can borrow the direct cost of education.
Only in this case is the model with concave utility able to generate a positive elasticity of
income.

[Table 5 about here.]

Consumption has a positive elasticity across generations in both versions of the model
albeit in dierent ways. Because utility is measured in reference to the consumption level
of the individual's parents, both models generate a a positive elasticity of consumption.
However, in the model with concave utility, because utility is everywhere concave so that

11 When

ρ > 0, as it almost surely is, the pattern of the results in Tables 5 and 6 stays the same, but there
is a higher built-in intergenerational elasticity.
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marginal utility is only slightly higher for a loss than for a gain, agents try to smooth
consumption as much as possibly between period 1 and period 2. This leads to an elasticity
of consumption that is approximately the same in period two as in total (period 1 plus period
2). In the model with loss aversion, however, an agent facing an unavoidable loss will lump
the loss in period 1 so as to reduce or eliminate the loss in period 2. This leads to a much
higher elasticity of consumption in period 2 than in total (or in period 1).
The model with loss aversion generates a positive intergenerational elasticity of income
primarily due to an auence net. Table 6 presents the transition probabilities in the data
and in the model under various assumptions of preferences and borrowing constraints. When
there are no borrowing constraints (columns (1) and (3)), most transition probabilities are
close to 20%, indicating no poverty trap or auence net. The model with loss aversion and
the mild borrowing constraint (column 2) has an auence net, while none of the versions of
the model generate a signicant poverty trap in which the children of the poor stay poor,
similar to the data for white families in the United States.

[Table 6 about here.]

5

Empirical Tests

As noted in

H1,

one important dierence between the model with loss aversion preferences

and the model with concave preferences is the shape of the education decision rule. With loss
aversion, the decision rule is J-shaped in reference (or family) consumption. In the model
with concave utility, education is either at or upward sloping in reference consumption,
depending on the borrowing constraints. I test these implications using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), specically the NLSY97, which began in 1997 and rst
surveyed the young respondents between the ages of 12 and 17. The NLSY97 collects data
on family income, education levels of parents, and the highest level of education completed
of the respondent.
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I use the NLSY rather than the PSID because the former includes a measure of ability,
the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT). Controlling for ability is important for
estimating the education decision rule. Most took the PIAT in 1997 when they were between
the ages of 12 and 17.

The PIAT consists of six subtests, covering such areas as reading

recognition and comprehension and mathematics, designed to help diagnose learning disabilities. PIAT results are reported in percentile scores, ranging from 0 to 99. Table 7 reports
summary statistics on test scores and other variables in the NLSY97.

[Table 7 about here.]

Because the NLSY lacks a measure of consumption, I am forced to use total parental
income as a proxy for reference consumption.

While this does not seem unreasonable, it

will bias the estimated decision rule to the extent that family consumption is dierent than
income. I use the average family income for the respondent before his eighteenth birthday.
The NLSY97 has at least two years of family income data for all respondents (those who
were 17 at the start) and a maximum of seven years for those who entered at age 12.
convert nominal income in the data to real using the CPI deator from the BLS

I

12 .

Regression results are reported in Table 8. The dependent variable is the highest grade
completed, measured in total years of education. The main explanatory variables are the
natural log of family income and its square.

I use robust standard errors to correct for

possible heteroskedasticity as the model calls for using family consumption as opposed to
the available family income. Custom sample weights provided by the NLSY were used in
all regressions. Column (1) provides support for a quadratic education decision rule in the
NLSY97 data set when controlling only for race and sex. The linear term in average family

12

The main weakness of the NLSY97 data set is that respondents were only between the ages of 24

and 29 during the last available wave of interviews in 2009 and so may not be done with their educational
investment.
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income is negative while the quadratic term is positive, signicant at the 1% level.

The

theoretical model implies that one should control for ability as well. The results presented in
column (2) control for ability, using the PIAT score. As expected, the coecient on ability
is positive (not shown) and signicant at 1%. The coecients on both linear and quadratic
family income continue to have the sign implied by the loss aversion model and are still
signicant at 1%.
While the model does not imply the need to control for parental education levels, there
could be a number of exogenous reasons to expect that parental education may have a positive
correlation with child education. Columns (3) and (4), show signicant coecients on both
family income and its square, even when controlling for parent education and ability level.
The dierence between columns (3) and (4) is that column (3) controls for the education
of the parents the child lives with (for example a mother and step-father) while column (4)
controls for the respondent's biological parents.

[Table 8 about here.]

The main weakness of the results in Table 8 is that the left side of the parabola implied
by the coecients is supported only by approximately 7% of observations, or those with
average family income below $7,600.
observations.

One possibility is that these represent mismeasured

However, households with under $10,000 per year in income occur with a

similar frequency in both the Current Population Survey (7.9% of households with dependent
children) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (8.4% of households), with about half of
those having income less than $5,000. This begs the question of how families can survive
in the United States on such low income with the answer probably including consumption
transfers from the government and/or family and friends which may not be reported as
income. To approximate a more realistic value of family consumption, I construct a measure
of consumption such that

ci = max(cmin , incomei ).

of Table 8 and use three values of

I repeat the regression in column (3)

cmin = {$10, 000, $15, 000, $20, 000}
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with the results

reported in Table 9.

The results are strongest for

cmin = $10, 000

with both coecients

strongly signicant and the minimum of the parabola at $14,000 with approximately 13%
of the observations on the left side of the J. Given this result, it is not surprising that the
regression coecients lose their signicance when we set a minimum consumption level above
this level.

[Table 9 about here.]

Another way to estimate the inuence of family income on education investment decisions
is to use a semi-parametric regression in which the regression does not place a linear or
quadratic restriction on the family income variable as in equation (12):

edi = f (inci ) + xi β + εi
xi

are the controls for ability, parental education, and demographics and the

f (·)

is assumed to be smooth with a bounded rst derivative (see Lokshin, 2006).

Where
function

(12)

Figure 3(a) provides the estimated function,

f (inci ) for the original reported values of family

income while 3(b) provides the estimated function using

cmin = $10, 000

as in Table 9. The

J-gure is evident in both, although certainly more prominent in the original data.

3(a)

implies a minimum of approximately $8,000 while 3(b) implies a minimum around $24,000.

[Figure 3 about here.]

6

Conclusion

A simple model with loss-averse preferences and education investment can generate a positive and signicant elasticity of intergenerational income, even when agents are able to
borrow the entire (direct) cost of their education and earning ability is completely independent across generations.

This expands on earlier work that required a much stronger
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(and less realistic) borrowing constraint to generate a positive elasticity of income between
generations.

Previous empirical work (see Bowles et al, 2005) has shown that observable

factors such as IQ, schooling, and personality, can only explain approximately half of the
currently accepted value of the intergenerational elasticity of income of between 0.45 and 0.6.
Loss averse preferences can explain about half the unexplained elasticity (0.14). A model
with concave preferences can only generate similar levels of the elasticity of intergenerational
income when there are severe borrowing constraints. While some students, especially in historically disadvantaged groups, may face diculty in borrowing for post-secondary schooling,
this does not seem to describe the experience of most students in the U.S.
The baseline model with loss aversion and weak borrowing constraints generates a positive
elasticity of income mainly by generating an auence net. Children born at the top of the
income distribution tend to get more education in order to avoid losses in the second period
of life. The loss averse model is able to generate an auence net and a percentage of children
who jump up from the bottom quintile to the top that match those rates found by Hertz
(2005) and Mazumder (2008) for white families.
While precise welfare statements are not possible in this partial equilibrium model, it
seems likely that loss aversion may generate behavior that is socially inecient, in that a
sizable portion of the population invests in less education than is socially optimal because of
borrowing constraints and loss-averse preferences. If that's the case, there may be a role for
public policy. Many industrialized countries have eliminated the direct cost of post-secondary
education for those who qualify. While this would help reduce the ineciency, additional
policies, such as increasing grants and loans to students, may also improve welfare.

The

United Kingdom conducted a pilot experiment in 1999 in which it paid students to stay in
school after the age of 16. Dearden et al (2007) found that these students did stay in school
longer than a control group.
Loss aversion has been found to help explain phenomena as diverse as trade policy (Tovar,
2009), asset pricing (Yogo 2008), physician behavior (Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003), and
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even the behavior of capuchin monkeys (Silberberg et al, 2008). Page et al (2007) conduct
an experiment in which people are asked to make a costly education-like investment in
order to increase future earnings and nd that people do have loss-averse preferences when
making these types of investments. In this paper, I show that when agents have loss-averse
preferences, there is a J-shaped education investment decision in reference consumption,
which is not the case if preferences are concave everywhere.

Using the NLSY97 data set

I nd support for this J-shaped decision rule, with those at the lower end of the parental
income distribution investing more in education than those immediately above them.
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Table 1: Consumption and Bequest Patterns for a Given Level of Resources
1
Rlt
Rmax
c1
c2
T0
lt
lt
lt
R +c0
R +c0
R −c0
≥ 2c0
≥ c0
3
3
3
2
2
Rmin +c0
Rmin
−c0
1
< c0
Rmax
2
2
c0 ≤ Rlt < 2c0
0 ≤ c1 ≤ c0
c0
0
lt
< c0
0
R
0

Description
Spread gains
Borrowing constrained
Concentrate loss in period 1
Concentrate loss in period 1
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Parameter
λ
β = R = (1 + r)
φ1
φ2
e, ψ
ψ̄
σψ

Value
2.25
1
0.0
0.3
[0,1]
0.5
0.15

Table 2: Parameter Values

Description

Source/Explanation

Loss aversion parameter
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
Rate of time preference & interest rate
Simplicity
Linear term in cost of education
Estimated from Dept. of Education,
Quadratic term in cost of education National Ctr for Education Statistics
Range for education and earning ability
Normalization
Average ability level
Standard deviation of earning ability, ψ 3 st. dev. above & below the mean
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Moment

Table 3: Target and Calibrated Moments

Target Loss Aversion Concave Utility
Education Distribution
High School Dropouts
7.9%
8.8%
8.7%
High School Grads
28.5%
23.8%
29.1%
Some College/Assoc. Degree
27.8%
27.5%
24.4%
Bachelor's Degree
23.1%
31.0%
25.3%
Master's Degree
9.2%
7.2%
11.1%
Prof. Degrees/PhD
3.5%
1.9%
1.4%
Median Income by Education Level (HS Grad = 1)
High School Dropout Wage
0.71
0.78
0.77
High School Grad Wage
1.00
1.00
1.00
Some College/Assoc. Degree Wage 1.19
1.57
1.37
Bachelor's Degree Wage
1.60
1.65
1.85
Master's Degree Wage
1.80
2.10
2.75
Prof. Degrees/PhD Wage
2.71
4.04
4.57
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Table 4: Calibrated Parameter Values

Parameter
Loss Aversion Concave Utility
α1 : linear term on education
0.285
0.250
α2 : quadratic term on education
0.190
0.000
ζ : interaction term (education*ability)
0.655
0.900
κ: linear term on ability
1.450
1.200
Minimum marginal return to education
3.1%
2.5%
Average marginal return to education
8.4%
7.3%
Maximum marginal return to education
13.9%
12.2%
Max-Min Wage Ratio
13.2
10.5
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Table 5: Intergenerational Elasticities

Data

(1)
No BC
Income
0.60 0.00
Education
0.29 0.00
0.09
Consumption (total)
0.68
Consumption (period 2)
0.79
Bequests
NA -0.01

Loss Aversion
(2)
(3)

Ωed = ε(e)

0.14
0.24
0.16
0.76
-0.05
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Ωp = f (c0 )

0.17
0.33
0.11
0.80
-0.02

(4)
No BC
0.00
0.00
0.32
0.33
-0.12

Concave Utility
(5)
(6)
Ωed = ε(e)

-0.00
-0.01
0.36
0.32
-0.18

Ωp = f (c0 )

0.14
0.26
0.36
0.39
-0.10

Table 6: Intergenerational Mobility

Data*

(1)
White Families No BC
Elasticity of Income
0.001
Poverty Trap
24.9%
23.4%
Auence Net
38.9%
23.4%
Jump Up
10.6%
23.3%
Fall Down
10.4%
22.9%
* Source: Mazumder (2008)

Loss Aversion

Simulations

(2)

(3)

Ωed = ε(e)

Ωp = f (c0 )

0.142
22.6%
46.4%
12.7%
23.6%
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0.171
23.5%
42.0%
11.8%
23.2%

(4)
No BC
0.000
22.8%
23.2%
23.2%
23.4%

Concave Utility

(5)

(6)

Ωed = ε(e)

Ωp = f (c0 )

-0.001
23.4%
23.2%
23.7%
23.7%

0.144
23.6%
30.2%
5.8%
22.8%

Table 7: Summary Statistics for NLSY79 and NLSY97 Data Set

NLSY97

# Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Variable
R's Highest Grade
8,853 12.98
2.62
7
20
1.077 1.14 12.47
Family Income (log) 7,474 9.89
PIAT
6,044 70.32
17.39
0 100
2.83
3
20
Mother's Educ (bio) 8,255 12.48
Father's Educ (bio) 7,100 12.59
3.17
3
20
Mother's Educ (res) 7,974 12.57
2.88
3
20
Father's Educ (res) 5,691 12.90
3.26
3
20
25.99%
Black
Hispanic
21.16%
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Table 8: Regression Results for Highest Grade Completed

Variable

Family Income (log)
Family Income (log) Squared

(1)

−2.562∗∗∗
(0.261)
0.175∗∗∗
(0.013)

Controls

AFQT(79)/PIAT(97)
Parent's Education
Sample Size
R2

(2)

NLSY97

−2.243∗∗∗
(0.330)
0.150∗∗∗
(0.016)

!***
7,401
0.160

5,093
0.260

(3)

−2.047∗∗∗
(0.395)
0.115∗∗∗
(0.020)

(4)

−1.172∗∗∗
(0.440)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.021)

!***
!***
!(res)*** !(bio)**
3,039
0.299

4,014
0.304

Signicant at: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
Robust standard errors in ( )
All regressions control for race and sex and use custom sample weights provided by the NLSY.
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Table 9: Regression Results with Minimum Consumption Level

Variable

cmin
Est. Family Consumption (log)
Est. Family Consumption (log) Squared
Controls

NLSY97
(1)
(2)
$10,000 $15,000

−3.124∗∗
(1.263)
0.164∗∗∗
(0.058)

!***
!***

PIAT(97)
Parent's Education (res)
Sample Size

3,039
0.299

R2

−2.393
(1.498)
0.131∗
(0.067)

(3)
$20,000
−1.817
(1.724)
0.106
(0.077)

!*** !***
!*** !***
3,039
0.299

3,039
0.299

Signicant at: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
Robust standard errors in ( )
All regressions control for race and sex and use custom sample weights provided by the NLSY.
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Figure 1: Utility and Marginal Utility for Strongly Loss Averse Preferences
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Figure 2: Utility Maximizing Education by Reference Consumption and Bequest Received
for Loss-Averse Agent
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Figure 3: Semi-Parametric Regression Results
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